Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory

Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory
Author :
Publisher : Routledge
Total Pages : 399
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9781351527163
ISBN-13 : 1351527169
Rating : 4/5 (63 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory by : Lester G Telser

Download or read book Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory written by Lester G Telser and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-09-05 with total page 399 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is ""the theory of the core of the market,"" and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.


Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory Related Books

Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory
Language: en
Pages: 399
Authors: Lester G Telser
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2017-09-05 - Publisher: Routledge

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competi
Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China
Language: en
Pages: 249
Authors: Huihua Nie
Categories: Social Science
Type: BOOK - Published: 2017-08-22 - Publisher: Springer

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of go
The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy
Language: en
Pages: 145
Authors: Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2017-11-16 - Publisher: MIT Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when
The Economics of Collusion
Language: en
Pages: 315
Authors: Robert C. Marshall
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2014-01-10 - Publisher: MIT Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement
Collective Dominance and Collusion
Language: en
Pages: 368
Authors: Marilena Filippelli
Categories: Law
Type: BOOK - Published: 2013-01-01 - Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against paralle